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OUT OF THE TWILIGHT ZONE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DA UBER T v. MERRELL DO W PHARMA CE UTICALS, 1NC.
Diana K. Sheiness
Abstract: In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had not implicitly incorporated the general
acceptance, or Frye, test for scientific evidence. Instead, the Court interpreted Rule 702 to
mean that judges should admit challenged scientific testimony only after determining that its
underlying method or theory is scientifically valid. This Note argues that the essence of the
Daubertdecision is that judges must ascertain whether or not the studies underlying proffered
testimony have been performed in accordance with sound scientific principles. The Note
analyzes several cases to illustrate appropriate and inappropriate applications of the new
standard. Finally, the Note suggests a three-stage inquiry that will enable judges to elicit the
information necessary for adequate evaluation of scientific studies.

That maggots arose from rotting meat and frogs from muddy fields
was common knowledge a few hundred years ago. Simple living things
were thought to spring from non-living matter through a process called
spontaneous generation.' This belief was not easily dispelled, and
spontaneous generation retained a large following as recently as the mid1800S.2

Around 1859, the French microbiologist Louis Pasteur made
observations causing him to suspect that fermentation was a biological
process mediated by yeast.3 He supposed that air currents must carry the
yeast to the surface of the fruit, and from there into the fermentation vats.
In the course of this work, he hypothesized that microorganisms such as
yeast grew only from other yeast, and did not spring to life
spontaneously.4 This proposal roused the ire of proponents of
spontaneous generation.5 To support his hypothesis, Pasteur designed an
experiment. First, he placed sterilized fermentable fluid into several
I. H. G. Wells, et al., The Science of Life 436-37 (1934).
2. Id.
3. Gordon Rattray Taylor, The Science ofLife 122-24 (1963).
4. Ren6 Dubos, Pasteur and Modem Science 44-48 (1988). A "hypothesis" is a conjecture
offered to explain a specified group of observations, and serves as guide and impetus for further
investigation. "Hypothesis" and "theory" are often used interchangeably, but more accurately a
theory is a verified or established explanation for the observations. Random House College
Dictionary654, 1362 (rev. ed. 1982). See also Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward
Providingthe Lay Trier with the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the
Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 915, 965-67 (1990) (describing how scientists
establish scientific knowledge).
5. Taylor, supranote 3, at 122-24.
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flasks with necks that were curved like the neck of a swan. He then
broke the necks off of some of the flasks. After the flasks were
incubated to provide an opportunity for microbial reproduction, only the
broken-necked flasks contained microbial growth. Microorganisms did
not enter the swan-necked flasks because the walls of the curved necks
had entrapped airborne microbes. This single carefully designed
experiment inspired numerous other scientists to cnduct studies that
confirmed Pasteur's hypothesis. Eventually, these studies collectively
dislodged the entrenched belief in spontaneous generation.
Under the Frye test, which predicates admissibility of scientific
evidence on general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community,6 Pasteur could not have testified to his elegant experiment
until other scientists had endorsed its credibility. Today, testimony based
on recent experimentation may be admissible at trial. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.7 rejected the
common law Frye test8 and ruled that trial judges should admit
challenged scientific testimony if it is scientifically valid and applicable
9
to the facts at issue.
This Note argues that the essence of the Daubert decision is that
judges themselves must ascertain whether challenged scientific evidence
is based on sound empirical observations. The Note contends that the
Daubert approach ensures better than the Frye test that judges will
recognize and exclude substandard scientific testimony, while admitting
valid but novel evidence. The remainder of the Note focuses on effective
implementation of the new standard.
Part II distinguishes between
"scientific" and other kinds of expert testimony to which judges should
not apply Daubert. Part III analyzes post-Daubert cases, pointing out
pitfalls that judges should avoid in employing the new standard. Finally,
the Note provides a hypothetical evaluation of a scientific study, and
suggests a method of inquiry that should provide the information
necessary for a thorough evaluation of scientific testimony.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
Id. at 2794.
Id. at 2796.

Evaluation of Scientific Evidence
I.

DAUBERT BANISHES THE FRYE TEST FROM FEDERAL
COURTROOMS

In Daubert, the Supreme Court resolved a disagreement among the
circuits regarding the treatment of scientific testimony under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975. For years prior to 1975, the Frye
test provided the common law standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.'0 However, the Federal Rules of Evidence did not address the
Frye test, leaving each federal circuit to decide for itself whether the
Rules were meant to supplant or to perpetuate this familiar standard.
Until Daubert, the issue of whether courts should still employ the Frye
test sparked considerable commentary."
A.

Debate Over the Frye Test

An appeals court created the Frye test in 1923 when it reviewed a trial
court decision to exclude evidence based on a newly-developed
deception test that was a predecessor of today's polygraph. 12 With no
reference to precedent, the court declared that the evidence was
inadmissible because the technique lacked standing and recognition
among psychologists and physiologists. 3 In an effort to distinguish
between experimental and demonstrable stages of scientific discovery,
the court stated:
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 4
Despite the subsequent widespread adoption of Frye, the test is not
discussed in the original Advisory Committee's Notes on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 5 Rule 702, which addresses expert testimony based
on scientific and other specialized knowledge, states:
10. Daubert noted that the Frye rule was still followed by a majority of courts. Id. at 2792-93.
11. Debates over Frye were a "well-established part of the academic landscape." Id. at 2793 n.4.
12. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13. Id. at 1014.
14. Id.
15. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1993 FederaIRulesof Evidence with Advisory
Committee Notes andLegislativeAction 156-57 (1993). However, in 1991, the Judicial Conference
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.16
The Frye test's proponents doubted the competence of juries and
judges to evaluate scientific methodology, and feared that the judiciary
was too overburdened to act as arbiter of scientific relevancy. 17 Those
favoring the test's abolition argued that it was illogical to reject sound
scientific evidence solely because it was novel, and urged a more active
judicial role in weighing scientific evidence. 8 Moreover, because
scientists stress skepticism rather than consensus, proving general
acceptance was sometimes indeed an excursion into the twilight zone. 9
Although the commentary accompanying Rule 702 did not explicitly
reject the Frye test, the Rules anticipated its demise by incorporating a
generally permissive view of the admissibility of evidence.2" After the
adoption of the Rules, about a third of American cotr-ts abandoned Frye
and adopted relevancy tests based on their individual interpretations of

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed amending Rule 702 to require that experts substantiate
the validity of their sources. The committee commented that the proposed amendment would not
mandate a retum to Frye. Id. at 157-58.
16. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
17. E.g., N. Kathleen Strickland & Leah S.Elkins, A CurrentAssessment of Frye in Toxic Tort
Litigation, in Toxic Tort Case Essentials:Strategies, Experts, Motions, and ADR, 446 PLI/Lit. 321
(1992) (describing both sides of the debate over the Frye test); Peter W. Huber, Galileo"s Revenge:
Junk Science in the Courtroom (1991) (expounding the theme that unFair toxic tort awards often
result from overly liberal admission of scientific evidence).
18. E.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Abolish the Frye Test, 12 Cal. Law, Apr., 1992, at 63 (arguing
that the Frye test assesses scientific validity essentially by counting heads); James E. Starrs, Frye v.
United States Restructuredand Revitalized: A Proposalto Amend Fedzral Evidence Rule 702, 26
Jurimetrics J.249 (1986); Strickland & Elkins, supra note 17 (summarizing case law to illustrate
split in interpreting Rule 702, and recommending "trustworthiness" as touchstone for admissibility
of scientific testimony).
19. E.g., Shiela Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32
Jurimetrics J. 345 (1992) (explaining that scientists frequently disagree regarding extent to which
various theories in their field are proven); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir.
1985) (discussing how courts have placed different meanings on concept of general acceptance).
20. See, e.g., Patricia A. Wrona, Combating "JunkScience" in Breast ImplantLitigation, Prentice
Hall Law and Business, Nov. 1992 (arguing that the liberal slant of the Federal Rules of Evidence
contributed to development by some courts of a "let it all in" approach to expert testimony).
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Rule 702.21 By the time Daubert reached the Supreme Court, sharp
differences had developed among the circuit courts regarding the
standards for admissibility of scientific evidence.'
B.

The Supreme CourtReplaces the Frye Test

In Daubert, the plaintiffs alleged that two infants' birth defects
resulted from their mothers' ingestion of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin
during pregnancy.2
The plaintiffs based causation on animal studies,
chemical structure similarities between Bendectin and drugs known to be
teratogenic, 2 a and statistical reanalyses of the results of previously
published epidemiologic studies.
The authors of the original
epidemiologic studies had concluded that Bendectin caused no
significant increase in birth defects.26 The district judge dismissed the
animal and chemical structure studies, stating that only epidemiologic
studies were pertinent to the issue of causation.27 The judge furthermore
rejected the statistical reanalyses because they did not meet the Frye test,
and granted summary judgment to the defendants. 28 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.2 9
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the split among the
circuits regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert
scientific testimony." The debate over Frye had generated pressure for a
Supreme Court decision on this issue, and Daubert provided a good
vehicle for resolving the matter. In numerous other Bendectin disputes,
the same testimony rejected by the Ninth Circuit had been admitted by

21. Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 63. Although state courts are not bound by the Federal Rules,
states tend to be influenced by federal courts, and many states have adopted rules of evidence based
on the federal model. See, e.g., Wash. R. Evid. 702.
22. E.g., Strickland, supra note 17 (discussing the split among the circuits); U.S. Dept. of the
Army, Pamphlet 27-22, Military Criminal Law Evidence, ch. 6-3 (1987) (listing circuit court
decisions that have supported or rejected Frye).
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
24. Teratogens are substances that induce abnormal embryologic development. Stedman's
Medical Dictionary1418 (24th ed. 1982).
25. Epidemiology is the study of the prevalence and spread of disease in a community. Id. at 474.
26. Daubert,727 F. Supp. at 575.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 575-76.
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct 2786,2792 (1993).
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some courts and excluded by others." Because large damage awards
were involved, the Bendectin controversy had gained a high profile. The
question Daubertpresented to the Supreme Court was whether the Frye
test was appropriate grounds for excluding the plaintiffs' reanalyses of
epidemiologic studies.
The Supreme Court concluded that the "austere" Frye test was
incompatible with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence.32
On this issue, the Court held unanimously that a court may not disallow
scientific evidence solely because it is not generally accepted. However,
the Court emphasized that diminished reliance on Frye did not mean that
the Federal Rules supported the indiscriminate admission of any
evidence purporting to be scientific. 33 To the contrary, the Court
reasoned that if scientific evidence is not based on sound scientific
principles, then it is not relevant under Rule 402, and hence cannot
satisfy the Rule 702 requirement that evidence be helpful to the trier of
fact.34 Thus, the Court designated trial judges as gatekeepers responsible
for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence."
The new
standard differs from the Frye test, but is no less exacting.3 6
The Court charged trial judges with determining whether proffered
testimony constitutes "scientific knowledge" that will assist the
factfinder in understanding or determining disputed facts.37 According to

31. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and SuJffciency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orangeand Bendectin Litigation, 86 1lW. U. L. Rev. 643, 661-68
(1992) (reviewing the major Bendectin cases, and revealing that the inconsistencies among the
Bendectin cases did not turn on the Frye test).
32. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Frye is "austere" because new or obscure theories that are
otherwise sound may lack sufficient exposure to have gained a large following.
33. Id. at 2794-95. The Daubertopinion was unanimous only with respect to the disposition of
the Frye test. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from the second part of the opinion, in
which the Court described how Rule 702 should be applied. Id. at 2799. The dissenters preferred
the opinion to stop with dissociating the Frye test from Rule 702. Id. at 2795 n.7, 2799.
34. Id. at 2795.
35. Id. at 2795 n.7, 2798. The dissenters lamented the majority's admonition to judges to become
"amateur scientists." Id. at 2800. However, the majority expressed -onfidence that judges were
capable of dealing effectively with scientific evidence. Id. at 2796.
36. Had the Court dismantled Frye without providing a strong alternative standard, the Daubert
decision might have suggested that the Court favored unbridled admission of all testimony offered
by qualified experts. See, e.g., Wrona, supranote 20.
37. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Federal Rule of Evidence 104, which addresses preliminary
questions, authorizes judges to consider admissibility of scientific evidence outside the hearing of
the jury. The relevant sections of the rule are:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning... the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
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the Court, "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science, and "knowledge" connotes more than a subjective
belief or unsupported speculation. 38
To qualify as "scientific
knowledge," an inference or assertion has to be based on the scientific
method.39
The Court further instructed trial judges to ensure that any scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is both relevant and reliable, and thus
helpful to the trier of fact.40 For these purposes, the Court equated
evidentiary reliability with scientific validity.4 In considering relevance,
the Court instructed judges to ensure that the proffered testimony was
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to be indeed helpful.42 This
means that judges must not only assess whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying challenged testimony is scientifically valid, but
also whether one can properly apply the evidence to the facts in issue.43
Moreover, the Court indicated that judges were to focus their analyses on
the methodology underlying the testimony, and not on the expert's
conclusions.'
In what may prove to be the most influential aspect of the opinion, the
Court recommended that judges weigh four factors in evaluating the

making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.

(c) Hearing ofjury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted
out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted
when the interests ofjustice require ....
Fed. R. Evid. 104.
38. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
39. Id. The Court essentially equated the "scientific method" with the method of empirical
observation practiced by modem scientists. This practice is embodied in the concept of
"falsifiability." See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
40. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
41. "In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity." Id. at 2795 n.9.
42. Id. at 2796.
43. The Court cautioned judges that what was scientifically "fit" for one purpose was not
necessarily valid for other purposes. As an example, the Court explained that a study of the phases
of the moon might demonstrate that a certain night was dark, but evidence that the moon was full on
a certain night could not assist a trier of fact in determining that an individual was likely to have
behaved irrationally on that night. Id.
44. Id. at 2797.
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scientific validity of expert testimony. 45 These :Factors are general
acceptance, publication in peer reviewed journals, the known or potential
rate of error and standards controlling the technique's operation, and
whether the theory or technique has been tested in accordance with
scientific methods.4 6 The Court stipulated that these four factors were
not meant to be a definitive checklist or test, and did not indicate how
they should be weighed or balanced.' 7 Nonetheless, because the four
factors provide specific guidance for assessing the admissibility of
scientific evidence, they are likely to be influential in future cases. At
the same time, their application could vary considerably, because the
Court did not clarify how future judges should gauge the relative
importance of each factor.
II.

TESTING IS THE HEART OF THE DAUBERT STANDARD

Unless judges apply Daubert in a consistent fashion, confusion may
develop over how to interpret the new standard. The testing requirement
embodies the essence of the new standard, and is the primary feature that
distinguishes the Daubert standard from the Frye test. Accordingly,
judges should base admissibility decisions primarily on the soundness of
the observations or tests that support the evidence, using the other three
factors to help determine whether or not the proffered evidence is
scientifically sound.
Courts should not misconstrue Daubert's inclusion of general
acceptance and peer review among the four factors as somehow
perpetuating the Frye test as a prerequisite for adraissibility. General
acceptance merits judicial attention because methodology or theories that
have been generally accepted are likely to withstand scrutiny under the

45. Id. at 2796-97.
46. Id. The Court characterized "scientific" hypotheses or methods as those subject to
"falsification," thereby endorsing the prevailing paradigm of "falsifiability" as defining what are
sound scientific principles. Id. The concept of "falsification" is based on the work of philosopher
Karl Popper, and concerns the modem scientific practice of inferring general conclusions based on a
set of organized empirical observations. Green, supra note 31, at 645. The concept recognizes that
while induction can never conclusively prove a hypothesis, it can falsify one. Id. This viewpoint
emphasizes the fact that empirical observations tend to work better to disprove than to prove
hypotheses. For example, a single striking exception to a broad and widely-held theory has great
power to destroy the theory's credibility, but rarely can a single observat on establish confidence in a
new theory.
47. Daubert,113 S.Ct. at 2796.
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other considerations mandated by the new standard.48 Similarly, peer
review is helpful in determining admissibility only because of its
relationship to the general acceptance and testing factors. 49 Although
publication in peer-reviewed journals is an important avenue by which
scientific theories eventually become generally accepted, it does not
necessarily indicate that a theory has already achieved general
acceptance. This is because such journals serve largely as a forum for
scientific progress reports. These reports contribute to the scientific
enterprise by inspiring other scientists to further test new theories. In
this sense, peer review and publication have a direct bearing on whether
or not theories and methods ever become generally accepted. However,
because general acceptance is not determinative under the new standard,
the Court would not have instructed judges to consider publication in
peer-reviewed journals unless peer review had some significance other
than its relationship to general acceptance.
Peer review does have a significant bearing on Daubert's testing
requirement. Since peer review tends to validate a study's soundness,
publication of the studies supporting an expert's opinion can add
credence to claims that the opinion's theoretical basis has been
adequately tested. Peer review tends to confirm that the testimony's
supporting studies were proficiently performed, even though the
publications may involve a novel hypothesis. Indeed, the only rationale
the Court offered for including the publication factor was that peer
review provides some quality control for studies submitted for
publication. 0 But while publication in a peer-reviewed journal may
attest to the validity of a scientific study, the converse is not true.
48. Id. at 2797. The Court noted further that firmly established theories were properly subject to
judicial notice. Id. at 2796 n.l 1.
49. Scientists invite peer review by submitting manuscripts describing their studies to the editor of
a scientific journal. To determine whether the manuscript merits publication, the editor will ask two
or three qualified scientists (the author's "peers") to referee the paper for conformity to scientific
standards. Based on the work's merits, each editor recommends whether the manuscript should be
published, revised after additional experimentation, or rejected outright. Copies of the reviews,
minus the referees' identities, are submitted to the author along with the editor's final decision for
the disposition of the paper. Journals generally also notify the referees of the final disposition of the
paper, a practice that discourages editors from arbitrarily overriding reviewers' recommendations. If
not satisfied with the review process, authors can request that the editor solicit opinions from
additional referees. As a consequence of these practices, the process provides a relatively objective
evaluation of scientific validity. See, e.g., Kreiling, supra note 4, at 970-71; Arnold S. Relman &
Marcia Angell, How Good is PeerReview?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827 (1989).
50. The Court stated that "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component
of 'good science' . . . because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will
be detected." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Once peer reviewers detect flaws in a submitted report,
publication becomes conditional on the correction of these flaws. See supranote 49.
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Accordingly, lack of publication is no longer a sufficient reason for
judges to label scientific evidence invalid.
Like publication, the rate of error is related to whether or not theories
or methods have been adequately tested.5" Although the Court did not
articulate any rationale for including this factor, it i.s important because
the very purpose of testing is to establish that a method is reliable. 2
Because a method's rate of error reflects the extent of its reliability, rate
of error bears directly on relevance. Accordingly, the Court's emphasis
on this factor is consistent with a judge's need to balance relevance
against potential for prejudice under Rule 403.13 The danger of juries
placing undue weight on the evidence is greater for scientific than for
other types of evidence. 54 For example, a judge might find otherwise
relevant evidence inadmissible when it derives from a diagnostic test
with a high rate of misidentification. Unless a court takes rate of error
into account, it cannot accurately weigh a statement's probative value
against its potential for prejudice.
In light of the foregoing, Daubert's primary message is that only
adequately tested theories provide a valid basis for scientific evidence.
This focus on testing will enable judges to determine whether challenged
scientific evidence is sufficiently sound to warrant admission, even when
they are dealing with novel methodologies. 55 Daubert reflects the fact
51. The rate of error for a technique or method is the frequency with which the method produces
erroneous results. Error can result from flaws in the underlying hypothesis, equipment failure,
arbitrary changes in established procedures, or human error. For discusions of this topic, see, e.g.,
Kreiling, supra note 4, at 978-82 (enumerating sources of error in scientific procedures); Green,
supra note 31, at 649-58 (reviewing common sources of error in epidemiologic studies).
52. Scientific studies often include statistical analyses or other indicia of reproducibility that
provide a measure of the data's reliability and significance. Such analyses can help judges
determine whether the studies are sufficiently reliable to support scientific testimony.
53. Fed. R. Evid. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
54. See Aronson, supra note 2 1, at 403-7 (explaining that juries can 1:e "mesmerized" by scientific
facts and theories, and hence are more susceptible to being confused, misled, or unduly prejudiced
by scientific than by other types of evidence).
55. Ironically, the Court's requirement for empirical testing does net resolve the admissibility of
the controverted evidence in the Dauberttrial itself. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was
not whether the evidence was admissible, but only whether the Frye test was appropriate grounds for
its exclusion. The trial judge excluded the reanalysis of previous epidemiologic studies primarily
because the plaintiffs had proposed an unorthodox method of assigning significance to the studies'
results. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989). In
claiming that the studies' results did indicate teratogenicity, the plaintiffs asserted that the studies'
findings had surpassed a threshold beyond which Bendectin should be considered dangerous, and in
essence argued for a lower threshold than the one generally used by epidemiogists. Id; see also
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that scientists themselves derive new knowledge by drawing
generalizations, or inferences, from concrete observations. To permit
scientific testimony based on untested theories would exempt the
testimony from the dictates of common sense. Unless somebody has
systematically verified a given method or hypothesis, not even the
testifying expert knows whether the method works as claimed or if the
hypothesis is credible.
III. DETERMINING DA UBERT'S APPLICABILITY
The new standard offers specific guidance for judges faced with
scientific evidence. Hence, before applying Daubert,judges evaluating
proffered expert testimony must distinguish "scientific" from technical or
other types of specialized knowledge. 6 However, the Court did not
explain how judges could determine which areas of expertise fell into
these presumably distinguishable categories. In light of this ambiguity,
there is a risk that courts will develop different criteria for determining
when Daubert is applicable. Some courts may confine the standard too
narrowly, while others may extend the new standard beyond its intended
reach. Defining the boundaries of the new standard will facilitate the
development of consistent applications.
A.

Daubert Should Not Be Applied to All Expert Testimony

While setting "scientific" apart from other types of expert testimony,
the Court provided no basis for differentiating "scientific" from the
"technical" evidence mentioned in Rule 702. According to one
dictionary, "science" means pertaining to a branch of knowledge dealing
with a body of facts systematically arranged and showing the operation
of general laws, or pertaining to any skill that reflects a precise
application of facts or knowledge." By comparison, "technical" means
pertaining to an art or science, being of significance primarily to persons

DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 911 F.2d 941, 946-49 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 961 (1994) (describing in detail the opposing parties' views of how the statistical analyses
should be done). Assignments of such thresholds are analogous to value judgments, hence the
proper designation for such a threshold cannot be determined by tests or experiments.
56. The Court stated, "[o]ur discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the
nature of the expertise offered here." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786,2795 n.8 (1993).
57. Random House College Dictionary 1179 (rev. ed. 1982).
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with specialized knowledge, or pertaining to the mechanical or industrial
arts and the applied sciences.5 8 These overlapping definitions provide
little guidance for the correct application of Daubert.
But courts need not rely on semantic distinctions to determine whether
or not Daubert should be applied. According to the Court, a key
question in resolving whether evidence is "scientific" is whether the
theory or technique is susceptible to testing, that is, to experimental
confirmation.59 Hence, judges should apply the new standard to all fields
of specialized knowledge whose tenets ordinarily are based on
experimental observations. Theories or methods susceptible to testing
should not escape scrutiny under Daubert merely because they can be
characterized as "technical." If an expert derives authority from a field
susceptible to testing but offers an opinion that eludes empirical
confirmation, the testimony should be excluded.
However, a
requirement of empirical testing for testimony whose sources are not
susceptible to verification would be too restrictive.
In cases subsequent to Daubert, courts have correctly refused to
extend Daubert to evidence that clearly was not scientific. In United
States v. Locascio,60 the defendants urged the Second Circuit to overrule
a pre-Daubert admission of the testimony of an expert on organized
crime families.6' The expert had based his opinion primarily on hearsay
and other ordinarily inadmissible sources.62 The appeals court refused
to interpret Daubert as imposing a mandatory requirement that only
verifiable sources be permitted to form the basis for expert testimony.63
In a similar dispute in Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Technologies,
Inc.,' a trial court refused to apply Daubert even though quantitative
statistical methods theoretically could have been used by the real estate
appraiser who testified as an expert witness.65 As in Locascio, the
Hawthorne witness's field of expertise could not rationally be classified
as scientific. Had these two courts ruled differently, most or all expert
testimony in those courts thereafter might have been restricted to
knowledge based on verifiable or documented sources. Such an

58. Id. at 1349.
59. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
60. 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 936.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 938.
64. No. 91 C 7167, 1993 WL 311916 (N.D. I1. Aug. 11, 1993).
65. Id. at *4.
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extension of Daubert would have been inconsistent with Rule 702's
liberal inclusion of testimony by those whose expertise comprises
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."66 Nothing in the
Daubert opinion indicates that the Supreme Court intended to constrict
the scope of Rule 702 as suggested by the parties in Locascio or
Hawthorne.
Dilemmas for judges may arise when they are confronted with
testimony based on areas of expertise that could apply scientific
techniques but typically do not. The Hawthornedecision nicely resolved
such a dilemma by presuming that the testimony was valid when others
in the same field routinely used similar methods. Application of Daubert
should be restricted to instances when the expertise at issue derives from
a field that normally utilizes scientific or quantitative techniques.
B.

Scientific Testimony Presentedby PhysiciansShould Be Subject to
Daubert

Judges should base their applications of Daubert on the nature of the
proffered testimony, rather than relying on the professional designation
of the expert witness. Physicians who testify in court traditionally have
been held to a subjective standard based on their willingness to assert
their opinion to a "reasonable degree of medical certainty."'67 Although
this standard is credible when physicians offer testimony that rests on
their years of clinical experience, it becomes illogical when it authorizes
physicians to ground their opinions in inadequate scientific studies.
The danger of misapplying the "reasonable degree of medical
certainty" standard is illustrated by Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.68 In Wells, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an award based on the
plaintiffs' contentions that a spermicide used during early pregnancy had
caused a child's birth defects.69 The plaintiffs' testimony rested on a few
highly questionable epidemiologic studies, while numerous other studies

66. Fed. 1R.Evid. 702. When the Rules were adopted, "experience" was added to the traditional
means by which persons could become qualified as experts, Under prior law, education and training
were the only permissible means for becoming qualified. Aronson, supranote 21, at702-2.
67. Bert Black, Evolving Legal Standardsfor the Admissibility of ScientificEvidence, 239 Science
1508, 1510 (1988) [hereinafter Black, Evolving Legal Standards];Bert Black, A Unified Theory of
Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 659-61 (1988).
68. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S. 950

(1986).
69. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 788 F.2d at 741-42.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 69:481, 1994

overwhelmingly supported the product's safety.7" Disregarding the
relative merits of the conflicting epidemiologic studies, the district court
painstakingly evaluated the demeanor, bias, and consistency of several
physicians and other experts who had presented testmony.71 Adhering
to the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" ;tandard, the judge
delved deeply into the manner in which the opposing experts had
expressed their beliefs, while placing little weight on the relative validity
of their underlying theories.72 However, the primary study upon which
the plaintiffs had relied was a preliminary report that was subsequently
repudiated by its authors.73
The Wells dispute fit squarely into the field of epidemiology, which
has well-established principles for determining whether or not a
substance causes deleterious effects in humans.74 Under Daubert, an
evaluation of this testimony would have focused o:a the quality of the
opposing epidemiologic studies, regardless of the witnesses' demeanors.
Scientific evidence should derive its aura of authority not from the
eloquence of its proponents, but from a general belief that the scientific
approach produces trustworthy results.7" The relative degree of certainty
expressed by several witnesses is less probative of a substance's toxicity
than are the actual data underpinning the witnesses' opinions. Whenever
testimony presented by physicians involves facts that derive from
scientific studies, courts should evaluate the testimony according to
Daubert, and not according to the "reasonable degree of medical
certainty" standard.

70. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 615 F. Supp. at 269.
71. Id. at 266-91.
72. The court explained that it did not intend to resolve the dispute about the safety of
spermicides, but rather to assess the credibility of the opposing witnesses by paying "close attention
to each expert's demeanor and tone." Id. at 267. Indeed, the testimony viewed most favorably by
the court was that of a physician who the court found to be particularly effective in conveying the
impression of credibility. Id. at 269-72. The inconclusive nature of the studies upon which the
physician relied apparently did not detract from his credibility in the eye; of this court. Id.
73. Jeff L. Lewin, Calebresi'sRevenge? Junk Science in the Work qf PeterHuber, 21 Hofstra L.
Rev. 183, 202 (1992). See also Black, Evolving Legal Standards,supranote 67, at 1511 (describing
the outrage in the medical community at the irresponsibility of the Wells decision).
74. Cogent and succinct summaries of epidemiologic principles are given in Green, supra note 31,
at 646-49, and in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946-49 (3d Cir.
1990).
75. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 (S.D. Ind. 1992)
(stating that "an expert is a conduit of facts and not merely a subjective speculator relying on stature
alone"), af'd,9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993).
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IV. POST-DAUBERTDECISIONS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND
THE UGLY
In addition to determining whether Daubertis applicable to proffered
expert testimony, courts encountering scientific evidence will face
numerous decisions concerning how the new standard should be applied.
Inconsistent applications could result from variations in how judges
evaluate scientific validity, or from differences in their willingness to reevaluate pre-Daubertrulings. Courts can avoid these inconsistencies if
they carefully limit admission of scientific testimony to that based on
adequately tested theories or methodologies, and if they ascertain that
Daubert has been satisfied before adhering to earlier admissibility
rulings.76
A.

The Good: Chikovsky CorrectlyApplied Daubert

Within three months of Daubert, a federal district court in Florida
refused to admit evidence supporting allegations that a pregnant
woman's topical application of Retin-A, an acne medication," had
caused her newbom's birth defects.78
In Chikovsky v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical,Corp., the defendants countered that the infant's defects
were consistent with a known genetic condition, and that absorption
through the skin of Retin-A was minimal.79 An obstetrician/gynecologist
testified on behalf of the plaintiff, and the court's analysis of this
doctor's testimony provides a model for effective application of the new
standard. 0
The court weighed the doctor's opinion on its scientific merits despite
its lack of published support, noting that Daubert had precluded using

76. Appellate courts will be required to re-examine cases that were tried prior to Daubert. See,
e.g., Porter,9 F.3d at 607 (concluding that criteria used by the trial court to evaluate the testimony
would have satisfied Daubert);Thomas v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 91-5326, 1993 WL 369129
(6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993) (requiring both parties to submit supplemental briefs where the trial records
were insufficient for Daubertanalysis).
77. Retin-A is applied topically, that is, directly to the skin, rather than being ingested.
78. Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
79. Id. at343.
80. Additional cases exemplify the appropriate analysis under Daubert. See, e.g., Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Penn, No. CRIM. 91-38, 1993 WL 388146 (V.I. Aug. 26, 1993) (evaluating
DNA fingerprinting under Daubert); Scales v. George Washington University, Civ. A. No. 89-0796LFO, 1993 WL 304016 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1993) (revealing the flaws and inconsistencies in the
statistical analysis presented by a social scientist to prove racial discrimination in hiring).
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general acceptance as a litmus test for admissibility.8 The doctor
admitted that Retin-A had never been tested directly for its
teratogenicity, 82 but testified that he had based his opinion in large part
on studies suggesting that high oral doses of vitamin A caused fetal harm
in humans. Retin-A is a derivative of vitamin A. The doctor attributed
the properties of vitamin A to Retin-A, a related but different compound,
without justifying this extrapolation."
Ironically, the doctor
acknowledged prescribing vitamin A to his own pregnant patients.84
Moreover, the doctor presented no evidence that Redn-A was capable of
penetrating the skin and entering the bloodstream. Ia short, there was no
experimental basis for the notion that Retin-A applied to the mother's
face could have reached the fetus.
In addition to the vitamin A studies, the doctor relied on published
indications that Accutane, another vitamin A derivative, was a potential
teratogen" However, Accutane is taken orally and in much higher doses
than Retin-A. Moreover, the birth defects with which it is associated are
different from those suffered by the infant in Chikovsky. Recognizing
these differences, the court held that the Accutane studies were not
relevant to the plaintiff's claims. 6
The Chikovsky court focused on the elements of sound scientific study
when it noted that the witness's hypothesis had not been directly tested,
that he had not ruled out other causes for the observed effect, and that he
had relied upon studies that were insufficiently related to the disputed
issue."' In essence, the court discerned that the physician's opinions
were not based on scientifically valid tests, and hence did not meet the
Daubertstandard.

81. Chikovsky, 832 F. Supp. at 344, 345 note 5 (noting that under Dcubertpublication was not an
indispensable prerequisite for admissibility).
82. See definition supra note 24.
83. Toxicologists have established that even a single change in a chemical's molecular structure
can vastly alter its effects in humans. Green, supranote 31, at 658.
84. Id. at 345-46. Furthermore, since the doctor was not traine-d in genetics, by his own
admission he could not rule out a genetic cause for the infant's defects. Id.
85. Id. at 346.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 345-46.
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B.

The Bad: Bynum Failsto Ensure that a Generally Reliable Method
Has Been Applied Appropriately

Despite a good faith effort to follow Daubert, the Fourth Circuit
confirmed the admission of evidence that had not met Daubert's testing
requirement. In United States v. Bynum, 88 the prosecution implicated the
defendant in a conspiracy to sell drugs in part by using gas
chromatography89 to demonstrate that three crack cocaine samples seized
from different locations had derived from a single source. After the trial,
the defendant discovered that gas chromatography had not been used
before for this purpose. He argued on appeal that the Frye test should
have precluded the testimony. Daubert was decided while the appeal
was pending, and the Bynum court concluded that the "government's
'9
proffer of evidence could hardly have better anticipated Daubert."
The prosecution had explained the hypotheses underlying gas
chromatography, had listed publications for which the technique had
been subjected to peer review, and had stated that the technique enjoyed
general acceptance among forensic chemists.9' However, this testimony
demonstrated merely that gas chromatography was a valid and generally
accepted technique. Even though the expert established that gas
chromatography could distinguish mixtures of chemicals that differed in
their composition, he did not establish that batches of cocaine invariably
differed in their chemical composition.92 Unless batches of cocaine so
differed, individual batches could not be distinguished by gas
chromatography. Under Daubert, the court should have required the

88. 3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993).
89. Chromatography is any physical process whereby the individual components of a chemical
mixture are separated by differential movement through a two-phase system. One phase of the
system contains the sample being analyzed, and the other phase is an adsorbent to which the
individual components of the sample become differentially attached according to size, electrical
charge, or other physical properties. In gas chromatography, the sample to be analyzed is vaporized,
then separated into its individual chemical components on a stationary phase. The resulting pattern
on the stationary phase reflects the kinds and amounts of the components in the original mixture.
Stedman's Medical Dictionary275 (24th ed. 1982).
90. Bynum, 3 F.3d at 773.
91. Id. at 773.
92. The expert's theory was that naturally derived products like crack cocaine will contain
numerous impurities and byproducts of decomposition. The expert proposed further that the precise
mathematical proportions of the various impurities would inevitably differ among samples of

cocaine unless the samples were manufactured together. Id. at 772 n.3. While plausible, the theory
contained two untested assumptions. The first of these was that crack cocaine actually contains
detectable amounts of several different impurities, and second, that different batches of crack vary
significantly with regard to their content of these putative impurities.
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prosecution to present studies showing that cocaine samples from several
different sources did not give similar results when analyzed by gas
chromatography.
Nor did the Bynum court consider the gas chromatography technique's
potential rate of error. Two different but equally qualified laboratories
had independently analyzed the three samples and bad differed in their
conclusions regarding one of the samples.93 Despite this compelling
suggestion that the technique produced inconsistent results for cocaine
analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the admission."
By contrast, a Washington state case illustrates a proper evaluation of
gas chromatography evidence.95 In State v. Huynh, the appellate court's
standard of review was the Frye test combined with a threshold
requirement of scientific reliability of the underlying technique.96 The
court's inquiry elicited the same type of information that would have
been drawn out in an analysis under Daubert. The prosecution's expert
had used gas chromatography to compare partially burned gasoline from
the scene of a suspicious fire with unburned gas from a can found in the
defendant's car. The court acknowledged the general utility of gas
chromatography for comparing gasoline samples. The court went on to
list several variables that may have affected the particular results in the
case and held that the variables had not been sufficiently tested.97
Accordingly, the court held that the testimony should have been
excluded. In contrast to the Bynum court, which considered only the
general acceptability of gas chromatography, the Huynh court evaluated
the reliability of the specific application of the technology.
The Bynum court's error was not benign. Because of this ruling, other
courts within the Second Circuit could consider gas chromatography
admissible without considering its potential unreliability in particular
applications. In Daubert,the Supreme Court explicitly cautioned judges
to ascertain that an expert's methods "properly can be applied to the facts

93. Id. at 772-73. For a sample-testing procedure to be considered reliable, the same results
should be obtained by any qualified laboratory that performs the test con-ectly. In Bynum, there was
no suggestion that either laboratory had performed the procedure incorrectly.
94. The court remarked that admission of the gas chromatography results was not central to the
case because so much other evidence had supported the conviction. Thus, the court could have
rejected the gas chromatography evidence without overturning the conviction. Id. at 773-74.
95. State v. Huynh, 49 Wash. App. 192, 742 P.2d 160 (1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1024
(1988).
96. Id. at 195-96, 742 P.2d at 163-64.
97. Huynh, 49 Wash. App. at 196-98, 742 P.2d at 164-65.
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in issue."98 Thus, when evaluating testimony based on well-established
technologies, courts should verify that the technique produces accurate
results when used for the purpose at stake. Unless a method's suitability
for a new use is verified, judges should not assume that the method is
relevant to the instant controversy.
C.

The Ugly: InappropriateReliance on PastDecisions

During the next several years, much expertise ruled admissible under
other standards will need to be reevaluated under Daubert. A judge's
failure to carefully perform this duty can perpetuate past errors, or can
result in the unfair exclusion of evidence based on technology that may
have been improved since its prior court review. Even well-established
forensic techniques should be re-examined to ascertain that they have
indeed satisfied Daubert'stesting requirement.
Testimony should not be admitted merely because prior courts have
found it admissible. The paraffin glove test fiasco illustrates the folly of
disregarding this admonition. In 1936, Commonwealth v. Westwood99
was the first appellate decision to approve the results of this new test as
evidence that a suspect had recently fired a gun. To perform the test, the
suspect's hand was coated with hot wax, and the cooled and hardened
wax was then peeled off along with any particles that were on the hand.
The particles were treated with a chemical that makes them turn blue if
they contain nitrates. A chemist testifying for the defendant pointed out
that not only gunpowder, but also common substances such as
toothpaste, cigar ashes, and matches contain nitrates."' ° Moreover, the
F.B.I. the previous year had published a bulletin reporting that smokers,
miners, chemists, and pharmacologists were likely to have substances on
their hands that would give a positive result with this test.'
Hence, a
basis for rejecting this test existed even in 1936.
Despite being aware of the paraffin test's innate unreliability, the
Westwood court admitted the testimony. The defendant claimed that the
test did not prove that he had fired a gun, but did not challenge the
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796 (1993).
99. Commonwealth v. Westwood, 188 A. 304 (Pa. 1936).
100. Id. at 308-09.
101. The Diphenylamine Testfor Gunpowder, 4 F.B.I. L. Enforcement Bull. 5 (1935). With no
apparent justification, the F.B.I. concluded in this same bulletin that the test was of value in
determining whether subjects had recently fired a gun. Perhaps this F.B.I. endorsement of the test
was responsible for the test's widespread acceptance among forensic scientists in the years that
followed.
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testimony under Frye. Thereafter, trial courts treated the technique as if
it were generally accepted."0 2 No report of the test's rejection by an
appellate court appeared until 1959,13 and the test was not thoroughly
discredited until 1967 when a comprehensive scientific evaluation of the
test was published."° The Daubert standard can ensure that mistakes
like that in Westwood are not perpetuated.1 5 Despite the paraffin test's
general acceptance, a proponent of this test would have been unable to
demonstrate the test's scientific validity as Daubertrequires.
Post-Daubertcourts have erred by excluding previously disreputable
evidence without a fair hearing,10 6 by admitting evidence based on
unvalidated methodology, 10 7 and by neglecting indications that a method
was error-prone when applied to the issues in controversy"' Judges
should take care to avoid these traps, and also to avoid perpetuating prior
endorsements of evidence without first ascertaining that earlier courts
had probed the methodology in a manner consistent with Daubert.°9
V.

EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Application of the new standard will be fraught with pitfalls,
especially for judges with little understanding of science. Such judges
should take full advantage of training and resources in the area of science
and law."0 In so doing, they will discover that the basic elements of a
102. Randolph N. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markersin Criminal Cases, 31 Emory L. J.
833, 854-57 (1982) (stating that forensic scientists embraced the paraffin test despite lack of
evidence for the test's reliability). As described by one commentator, "[t]he number of convictions
tainted by the paraffin test cannot be estimated." Alfred H. Novotne, Scientific Evidence:
ChallengingAdmissibiliy, Dept. Army Pamphlet, 27-50-190,23 Army Law (1988).
103. Brooke v. People, 339 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1959) (rejecting the paraffin test based on a 1956
report noting the test's tendency to give false positive results).
104. Mary E. Cowan & Patricia L. Purdon, A Study of the "ParaffinTest," 12 J. Forensic Sci. 19
(1967).
105. See Starts, supra note 18, at 257-58 (discussing instances when udicial notice has served to
perpetuate erroneous decisions to admit scientific evidence).
106. United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) (excluding polygraph evidence on
the basis of earlier decisions that did not discuss the scientific validity of the method).
107. See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
108. See supranote 93 and accompanying text.
109. Once the scientific validity of a method or theory has been ascertained under Daubert,
judges thereafter can invoke judicial notice with respect to that same metxod or theory.
110. If judges assimilate basic scientific principles, these will be applicable to a wide range of
scientific issues. Resources soon available to judges will include a set of protocols for forensic
techniques, and a reference manual jointly sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center and a task force
of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government. The manual will detail the
range of techniques that judges have used to manage science and technology issues in litigation.
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sound empirical study are similar across a broad range of scientific
disciplines. Hence, judges who become familiar with one or more fields
of science will be better equipped to deal with the diverse categories of
scientific testimony presented in their courtrooms. Although each type
of testimony will require fact-specific determinations, each evaluation
should focus on the basic design of the underlying studies.
A.

A HypotheticalDaubert Analysis ofPasteur'sExperiment

Analysis under Daubertcan be illustrated by asking whether Pasteur's
compelling refutation of spontaneous generation would be admissible
today. In this hypothetical, spontaneous generation is still widely
believed to occur, but Pasteur is asked to testify in court that airborne
germs probably account for the microbial growth seen in flasks of
incubated fermentation broth. Pasteur would describe the experiment
with the swan-necked flasks as support for his opinion. Since the work is
too recent to have been published, peer review cannot lend credence to
its soundness.
Thus, the judge should ask whether Pasteur had adequately ruled out
other explanations for his observations. If Pasteur's control flasks were
identical to the experimental ones save for their broken necks, the judge
should conclude that alternative explanations have been adequately ruled
out. A possible reason to exclude the evidence would be if the two
groups of flasks were made of different kinds of glass, and growthinhibiting chemicals had leached out of the swan-necked flasks, hence
preventing the replication of any spontaneously-generated organisms that
may have appeared in those flasks. But if all of the flasks were made
from the same glass and no other flaws in experimental design become

Other task force projects include assembling rosters of experts for use by the judiciary, and generally
fostering institutional ties between the judiciary and the scientific community. Moreover, the task
force has recommended that scientific methodology be integrated into traditional training programs
for judges, and that a national Science and Justice Council be established to facilitate developments
in this area of law. In addition, the Federal Courts Study Committee has issued a set of
recommendations for how judges could handle scientific issues in a report published in 1990, and the
Judicial Conference of the United States is actively researching similar issues. Carnegie
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Science and Technology in Judicial
DecisionMaking (1993). In another joint project, the task force and the Federal Judicial Center have
devised and tested a training program to be made available to all of the judiciary, and that focuses on
problems arising from computer-generated evidence, recent developments regarding DNA evidence,
questions regarding causation in toxic tort litigation, and case management techniques. Rorie
Sherman, "Junk Science" Rule Used Broadly, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 3. In addition to these
resources, the journal Jurimetricsdeals routinely with the various intersections of law and science.
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apparent, Pasteur's experiment should be accepted as having satisfied
Daubert'stesting requirement.
Pasteur's findings will not satisfy a general acceptance requirement
because the hypothetical specifies that he has had no opportunity to
publish. Even if he had, his skeptical colleagues would withhold
judgment on the new theory until other scientists had verified its
predictions. Under Frye, this lack of general acceplance would be fatal
to Pasteur's testimony. While Daubertpermits consideration of general
acceptance, it explicitly forbids excluding testimony solely because
general acceptance is lacking.
Under these circumstances, Pasteur's testimony should be viewed
favorably provided the experimental method he used had a low rate of
error. The judge should ask the frequency with whiclh the expected result
was obtained in several trials of the experiment. For example, if
microbial growth appeared in the swan-necked flask in 15 out of 30
trials, the judge probably would conclude that Pasteur's sterilization
procedure was so unreliable that the demonstration was not relevant to
the issue of spontaneous generation. But if microbial growth were
consistently and reproducibly absent from the swan-necked flasks, the
judge should proceed to weigh the testimony's probative value against
the likelihood of the jury being prejudiced by Pasteur's presentation.
As this hypothetical illustrates, the new standard corrects several
deficits of the Frye test. Critics of Frye have long protested that
automatic exclusion of novel testimony was unfiair.'
The Pasteur
hypothetical illustrates how even novel testimony can receive a fair
hearing under the Daubert standard. Moreover, the Daubert standard,
unlike the Frye test, acknowledges that the courtroom is the judge's, not
the scientist's, bailiwick. Communities of scientists rarely display the
unified consensus envisioned by the Frye test, and scientists' reluctance
to draw unqualified conclusions is at odds with the legal necessity to do
just that within the short time span of a trial.
B.

Scientific Evidence Should Be Evaluatedat Three Levels

Although the range of scientific knowledge is broad, the following
three-stage inquiry should suffice in most cases to elicit the information
necessary for analyzing testimony under Daubert. First, is the technique
or method itself scientifically valid? Second, is it valid to apply the
technique to the specific factual matter at issue? Third, was the
11I. See supra notes 17-18.
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technique competently applied in this particular instance?
For
methodologies previously ascertained in court to be scientifically sound,
judicial notice may suffice to answer the first two questions, but the third
can be addressed only on a case-by-case basis. For novel evidence,
judges should require that all three questions be answered satisfactorily
before admitting the testimony.
In the first stage of this inquiry, the judge should appraise the validity
of the basic methods or theories supporting the testimony. A sound
method or theory is one that is based on scientific studies that addressed
sources and rates of error, and in which the investigators ruled out
alternative explanations for their observations."' The judge's inquiry
should include ascertaining that the methodology did not employ
13
unwarranted analogies."
In the second part of the inquiry, the judge should establish that the
studies underlying the testimony actually encompassed the specific
application of the technique at issue. For example, the judge in Bynum. 4
should have required the prosecution to demonstrate that gas
chromatography was capable of reliably identifying and differentiating
samples of cocaine, even though the reliability of gas chromatography
had been established for general purposes.
For the third part of the inquiry, the judge should require experts to
demonstrate that the instant application was proficiently performed, and
that testing was conducted by qualified personnel. For example, judges
could examine laboratory records of specific applications in order to
ascertain that tests were performed in accordance with the proper
procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The blossoming of modem science has increased the need for the
judiciary to ensure the credibility of scientific evidence. The Daubert
decision provides a requirement for empirical testing that will bolster
judicial efforts to screen out unreliable scientific testimony while
admitting all testimony that is relevant and helpful to the trier of fact.
However, judges should apply Daubert only to fields of expertise that
112. See, e.g., Kreiling, supra note 4, at 965-67 (discussing in general the format for scientific
studies).
113. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the court's refusal to ascribe the
properties of vitamin A to Retin-A).
114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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customarily are considered scientific. When the new standard is
applicable, judges should ascertain not only that the expert's opinion is
founded on adequately tested methods or theories, but also that those
methods produce meaningful results when applied to the matter at issue.
Judges should base admission decisions on precedents only when the
earlier evaluations used criteria compatible with Daubert. By thus
limiting the admission of scientific testimony, courts can effectively bar
irrelevant scientific evidence without repressing demonstrably valid
evidence even when it is novel and unpublished.

